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Economics, Ecology and the Development and 
Use of GMOs: General Considerations and Biosafety Issues 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article outlines both ecological and socioeconomic issues involved in the 
development and use of GMOs. It’s argued that while initially new GMOs add to the 
global stock of biodiversity, in the long-term they result in a decline in biodiversity. 
Various mechanisms that bring about this decline in genetic diversity are identified. It 
is suggested that due to evolutionary forces, the desirable genetic properties of some 
GMO may be eroded in the long-term. They are unlikely to be sustained in their 
ecological effectiveness forever. The economics of developing and marketing of 
GMOs is given particular attention. When their development is left to private 
enterprise, it is found that the economics of developing and marketing GMOs favours 
large enterprises as primary suppliers. In marketing, there are also preferences for 
sales of GMOs to larger-sized commercial farms rather than smaller-sized ones. 
GMOs that are favoured for development are in demand for use in large agricultural 
markets, many of which are located in higher income countries. Aspects of the 
patenting of GMOs, co-evolution, various social conflicts in the use of GMOs and 
legal liability for damages caused by the development and use of GMOs are discussed 
both from a socioeconomic and biosafety point of view. 
Economics, Ecology and the Development and  
Use of GMOs: General Considerations and Biosafety Issues 
 
1. Introduction 
The development of genetically modified organisms has generated both high 
expectations about their ability to increase economic production and help reduce 
economic scarcity as well as dire predictions about how they might reduce 
biodiversity and health risks and in the long-term threaten economic sustainability. 
However, assessment of the economic costs and benefits of the development and use 
of GMOs is complex as is the evaluation of their ecological consequences. Some of 
the issues that have been raised or discussed in Tisdell (2000) and further aspects are 
covered in Tisdell (2002). 
It should not be assumed that the use of all GMOs will reduce economic scarcity. 
Individual cases need to be assessed. Some may and others may not reduce economic 
scarcity. Furthermore, in the case of those GMOs which reduce scarcity, their 
scarcity-reducing benefits may diminish with the increased frequency of uses. 
The use of GMOs inevitably results in ecological changes. It is argued in this paper 
that the use of GMOs is likely to in a decline in biodiversity in the long run. 
Furthermore, some of the desired attributes of particular GMOs may be eroded in due 
course by the operation of evolutionary forces. The economics of developing and 
marketing GMOs is also analysed in this article. It is argued that when this is left to 
the private sector, the development of GMOs is heavily influenced by the nature and 
the economics of property rights in them. Economic factors favour the development 
and marketing of GMOs by large enterprises. Furthermore, economic considerations 
favour the development of GMOs to satisfy the requirements of large-scale 
commercial farms and those farms are the prime markets for GMOs. Several other 
socioeconomic and biosafety issues are important when considering the development 
and use of GMOs. These include the building of patent walls, lack of co-evolution and 
related safety issues, and social conflicts about the use of GMOs. Legal liability is 
also important. These are all discussed in this article. 
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2. Ecological Issues 
Initially, the introduction of a GMO adds to the extent of global biodiversity. 
However, it is not an equilibrium situation. The continuing use of the GMO is likely 
to change the ecological balance with the passage of time and eventually reduce the 
extent of genetic diversity. The reduction in biodiversity may come about as a result 
of a variety of processes. 
Processes of long-term biodiversity loss 
Cross breeding with a GMO may eliminate naturally some other varieties or strains of 
living organisms. Cross breeds may become established as dominant types and 
eliminate some existing varieties of species. Furthermore, GMOs may escape into the 
wild and in some instances, may outcompete and eliminate some competitive 
organisms. However, this could be a rare event because many GMOs may only be 
able to survive under artificially managed environmental conditions, such as are 
common in modern agriculture. 
An important indirect route by which GMOs can lead to a loss in genetic diversity is 
if they provide an economic incentive for the extension or intensification of 
agriculture, aquaculture or silviculture. Extensions of these land uses are likely to 
reduce the size and variety of habitats available to other species and reduce 
biodiversity in the wild. Intensification can also reduce the availability of diverse 
micro-habitats and reduce the presence of species inhabiting these. The greater the 
commercial economic success of a GMO, the more likely are these impacts, 
particularly if the demand for the produce of the GMO is fairly elastic. 
Apart from this, a commercially successful GMO may displace similar traditional 
varieties of organisms in agriculture, aquaculture or silviculture due to economic or 
commercial selection (Tisdell, 2003 a). The consequence is a loss of human modified 
or developed genetic stock. Thus in the long-term, the sustained use of GMOs can 
reduce both biodiversity in the wild as well as the available stock of human modified 
or genetic material. Figure 1 summarises these consequences. 
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 New GMOs add Initially to 
Biodiversity 
Subsequently New GMOs 
Reduce Biodiversity by 
Varied Routes 
Reduction of Biodiversity in the 
Wild due to: 
• Expansion of agriculture (eg loss 
of habitat) 
• Direct ecological spillovers 
Reduction in Diversity of Genetic 
Material Developed by Humans due 
to: 
• Greater profit from use of GMOs 
results in replacement 
• Adverse ecological spillovers 
Figure 1: A chart indicating how the use of GMOs can reduce genetic diversity 
in the long run. 
 
Genetic erosion 
The quality of some desired attributes of GMOs may be diminished in the long run by 
evolutionary processes. For example, it is conceivable that in the long run, an insect 
pest (as a result of natural selection) could develop increased resistance to Bt modified 
crops. Another possibility is that pests not affected to any great extent by Bt may 
eventually increase their populations and affect to some extent the benefits otherwise 
obtained from Bt modification. Ecological evolution and change may occur in natural 
organisms to take advantage of new niches opened up the presence of genetically 
modified organisms.  
Genetic modification can involve trade-off between attributes  
In genetically modifying an organism in order to increase its fitness for a particular 
purpose, there is a risk that other relevant traits will be weakened and negative 
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characteristics may occur. These are not always anticipated by scientists. For example, 
Dr. Liu (2008) has reported that exudates from Bt cotton roots in China increase its 
susceptibility to cotton blast, a fungal disease. The incidence of this disease has 
increased and is causing a substantial decline in cotton yields in China. This trait of Bt 
cotton was not predicted by scientists. 
tle has made them 
more vulnerable to attack by another species of beetle (Lu, 2008).  
reatest net economic 
benefit in relation to the attainable set of genetic combinations. 
Reduction in interspecies competition as a negative consequence of GMOs 
nomic problem if herbicide-resistant 
GM rice becomes available for commercial use. 
A Chinese scientist (Lu Menzhu, 2008) has also reported that China has genetically 
modified some species of poplar trees to reduce their lignin content. Their lowered 
lignin content reduces the cost of processing them for paper production. But the lower 
lignin content makes the trees more prone to damage by wind and may increase their 
susceptibility to some species of pests. Furthermore, it has been found the 
development of Bt poplars to control attacks by one species of bee
Some of the trade-offs as a result of genetic modification appear to be predictable but 
others are uncertain. When such a trade-off is unavoidable, there is an associated 
economic problem in the case of organisms that are used commercially, namely to 
ensure that the genetic combination engineered gives the g
Two mechanisms have been mentioned that can result in the fitness of GMOs being 
undermined. These are genetic erosion and the need to trade-off traits. Another factor 
that can reduce the economic suitability of GMOs is that their presence may improve 
the competitiveness of competing species some of which may be regarded as pests. 
The case of Bt poplars has already been mentioned. Another case involves herbicide-
resistant GM rice. This has been developed experimentally in China. It has been found 
that it is prone to cross-fertilise with wild rice which is regarded as a weed in rice 
crops (Lu, Baorong, 2008). Because there is less rural labor available for weeding by 
hand in China due to the rural to urban migration drift, the increased resistance of GM 
wild rice to herbicide could become a serious eco
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Selective breeding less risky 
Note the above ecological changes can also occur when a new variety of organism is 
introduced by selective breeding, that is the natural ecological disturbances mentioned 
can occur plus those induced by economic change (Tisdell, 2003a). However, it is 
usually believed that such changes will be smaller and slower when selective breeding 
is adopted for genetic development than is potentially possible when new GMOs are 
introduced. Hence, the ecological risks and uncertainties associated with the 
introduction of GMOs are usually considered much higher than in the use of selective 
breeding. The introduction of hybrids poses even less ecological risk when they are 
unable to reproduce themselves. However, their introduction can vial economic 
exterior and intensification lead to an indirect reduction in biodiversity. 
3. Economics of Developing and Marketing GMOs 
General influences of economic factors on the nature of development and marketing 
of GMOs 
High costs and considerable business risks are involved in developing GMOs. 
Therefore, when their development is left to private enterprise, only large firms 
usually engage in this activity. Furthermore, if businesses are to have an economic 
incentive to develop new GMOs, then they must be assured of intellectual property 
rights. Patents are used in many countries for this purpose.  
However, it is important to note that patent laws and regulations covering the granting 
of patents in relation to GMOs are not the same in all countries. For example, in 
China, patents are granted on the techniques for producing specific GMOs but not on 
the products produced as a result of the availability of those techniques (Greenpeace 
China and Third World Network, 2008). For example, a patent would be granted in 
China on techniques to produce a Bt modified plant but not in seed which transmits 
this genetic trait. However, in the United States both techniques for producing 
genetically modified organisms and the products produced as a result of applying 
these techniques are protected by patent law. The economic analysis of GMOs that 
follows is based on the assumption of strong and extensive patent laws of the type 
adopted in the United States. 
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Patents grant a monopoly to the patentee to use the patented invention for a specific 
number of years. During this period, the inventor has a monopoly in the use of the 
invention, in this case a new GMO. A business that has a patent for a GMO may, 
therefore, engage in monopoly–pricing of its use. This is not socially ideal. (Tisdell 
and Hartley, 2008, pp. 36-37, Ch. 8). However, it is necessary for the inventor to be 
sufficiently rewarded for his/her inventiveness. Otherwise, there is no private 
economic incentive to engage in R& D effort. This is particularly important bearing in 
mind that not all research efforts are successful in developing an economically viable 
new product. Furthermore, the patent is only for a limited period of time and there is 
no guarantee that some other firm will not develop a commercially superior 
competitive GMO within this period. This will limit the profit possibilities available 
to the original patentee. 
In addition, the level of the monopoly price of say GM seed will be influenced by the 
price of competitive traditional seed and by farmers’ net profits when using this seed 
(Tisdell, 2006, p.221). This constrains the price which the owner of GM seed will find 
it profitable to charge. In some instances, however, the GMO-monopolist may 
deliberately charge a low price initially for the use of its GMO to encourage its 
adoption and eliminate the use of competing traditional organisms. This predatory 
behaviour can eliminate competing traditional varieties of a crop and can be a prelude 
to higher monopoly prices for the GMO (Tisdell, 2006, p.222). 
The legal costs of protecting patented GMOs against infringements of rights can be 
high. Once again, this tends to favour large firms as developers of GMOs. 
The establishment of legal property rights in new GMOs is only part of the economics 
of developing and marketing them. The transaction costs of marketing GMOs (for 
example GM seed) are high because considerable effort is required to ensure that the 
buyers do not re-use or sell any GM seed they produce without permission. This adds 
to the cost of drawing up contracts with clients, there are costs incurred by sellers in 
monitoring the use of GMOs by buyers to ensure compliance with agreements, and 
there may be considerable legal costs if breach of contract occurs. Similar costs do not 
arise in the case of hybrids. 
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These transaction costs favour the marketing of GMOs by large companies. They also 
favour their sale to larger-sized agricultural and related enterprises because market 
transaction costs per unit of the GMO sold tends to decline with the value of sales to 
an individual production unit.  
Taking into account potential economic gains and transaction costs, there is an 
economic incentive to develop GMOs that are likely to be adopted by large-scale 
commercial enterprises, particularly in higher income countries. Furthermore, 
organisms (for example, crops) for which there is a large volume of demand are likely 
to the favoured, other things equal. Private businesses have little incentive to develop 
GMOs to suit farming involving small-scale units or semi-subsistence. Therefore, 
crops which are important in LDCs (but not in higher income countries) are unlikely 
to be targeted by private enterprises for the development of GMOs unless they are 
plantation crops, possibly involving foreign investment. Figure 2 provides an 
overview of predicted patterns of development of GMOs by private enterprises when 
economic considerations are taken into account. 
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High Overhead Costs 
For developing and marketing GMOs and for 
protecting property rights favour large enterprises 
as primary suppliers of GMOs 
Market Transaction Costs 
Favour the development of GMOs to meet the 
demands of larger-sized agricultural (and similar) 
units 
Products for which there is a large commercial 
market are likely to be preferred for GMO 
development 
Industrial-type agriculture is likely to be favoured, 
that is agricultural industries that are prominent in 
higher income countries or which involve 
investments in plantations abroad by higher 
income countries 
 
Figure 2: A chart showing predicted patterns of development of GMOs by 
private enterprises due to economic considerations. 
Support from economic theory for the above propositions 
Support for several of the above propositions about likely patterns of development 
and use of GMOs can be provided by the application of basic economic theory. In 
order to show this, assume that the GM product is GM seed and consider the 
proposition that, other things being equal, the economic incentive to develop such 
seed is greater the larger is the expected size of the market for it. For simplicity, 
assume that the successful development of the GM seed will establish a monopoly for 
it.  
In Figure 3, line BD1 represents the demand for the GM seed if the market is small 
and the line D2D2 represents the demand for it if its market is larger. The average 
operating cost of supplying the GM seed once it has been developed is assumed to be 
a constant OA and therefore, line AC represents the average variable cost of its supply. 
The line AMR is the marginal revenue line corresponding to the demand relationship 
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BD1. Hence, when demand is at level BD1, the maximum operating profit of the 
producer of patented GM seed is equivalent to the area of quadrilateral AFJP1. There 
is a mark-up on average operating costs for each unit of seed sold of AP1. If this 
margin is retained when the demand for the seed is much higher at D2D2, operating 
profit increases substantially. It rises by an amount equal to the area of rectangle 
FGHJ, that is by an amount equivalent to (X2 − X1). (P1 − A). Therefore, the 
economic advantages of a larger-sized market are apparent. 
$ 
J 
F 
MR 
D1
D2 
H 
G
D2
C
X X2X1O 
A 
B 
P1
Quantity of GM seed sold 
 
Figure 3 An illustration that the larger is the size of the expected market for a 
GMO, the greater is the profitability of developing it, other things held 
constant. In the case illustrated, the operating profit of patented GM 
seed in the larger-sized market is equal to the area of rectangle AGHP1 
but in a smaller-sized market it is only equal to the area of rectangle 
AFJP1. 
Observe also that if there are fixed overhead costs to be recovered (for example, the 
costs of the R&D invested in the creation of the GMO), this will also favour markets 
of larger size. When overhead costs are taken into account, the average total cost of 
supplying a new type of GM seed might be as indicated by the declining curve 
marked RST in Figure 4. Line BD1 represents the demand for the GM seed if the 
market is relatively small and D2D2 represents demand if the market is larger. Because 
of the overhead costs involved, the development of GM seed for the smaller-sized 
market is unprofitable but it is profitable for the larger-sized market, other things 
being equal. 
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Figure 4: An illustration that when overhead costs are large (as they are likely to 
be for the development and marketing of GM seed) the development of 
a GMO smaller-sized markets is unlikely to be profitable. This is due 
to the declining nature of average total cost. In the case illustrated, 
development is unprofitable if market demand is as shown by BD1 but 
is profitable in the larger-sized market where market demand is shown 
by D2D2. 
When the demand for using an organism is relatively inelastic, this can increase the 
profitability of developing a GMO, other things being held constant. The more 
inelastic is the demand for a resource, the higher is the monopoly price that can be 
secured by monopolist from it and the greater are the profits from its supply, other 
things being equal. This is illustrated in Figure 5. If demand for GM seed corresponds 
in this diagram to BD1, then making the same assumptions as previously made for 
Figure 3, the patentee’s monopoly price is P1 and his/her profit is equal to the area of 
rectangle AFJP1. Should, however, the demand curve for the GM seed be steeper, as 
for example indicated by the line D2D2, the profit-maximizing monopoly price will be 
higher. In the case illustrated it is P2. Consequently, operating profit from selling the 
GMO rises by an amount equivalent to the area of rectangle P1JKP2. The steeper or 
more inelastic the demand curve, the greater is the monopoly profit. Hence, if the size 
of the market for GM seed is large and the demand for it is relatively inelastic, this 
provides a strong economic incentive for the development of GM seed. 
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Figure 5: An illustration that other things held equal, the profitability of 
developing a new GMO is greater the more inelastic is the predicted 
demand for it. In the case illustrated demand relationship D2D2 is more 
inelastic than BD1 and the profitability of supplying GM seed is higher 
in the former case. 
It was argued above that sellers of GMOs are likely to find it more profitable to sell to 
large-scale farms than smaller ones. This is based on the view the average transaction 
costs involve in sales are likely to fall as the quantity sold to any production unit rises. 
This is illustrated by Figure 6. In Figure 6, line AFL represents the average production 
cost of the supplier of GM seed and curve HJK represents the average total cost of 
supplying GM seed to a farming unit. The difference between line AFC and curve 
HJK represents the level of average marketing transaction costs involved in selling 
GM seed to a farm. Suppose that the seller of GM seed sells it at P1 per unit. Then it is 
unprofitable to sell GM seed to farms that wish to buy less than x1 of it. For those 
farms wanting to buy more than x1 of seed, the profit of the seller rises with the 
amount sold to a farm. Hence, the hypothesis stated above that developers of GMOs 
favour developing these for industries in which large commercial farms exist is 
supported. 
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Figure 6: An illustration of the proposition that developers of GM seed are likely 
to find it more profitable to sell it to large commercial farms than small 
farms. In the case illustrated, it is unprofitable for the seller to sell to a 
farm which buys less than x1 of seed. 
4. Other Socioeconomic Issues and Some Further Biosafety Matters 
Patent walls 
Use of the patent system by creators of new GMOs can be used in special cases to 
create patent walls. This involves the use of a range of unilateral patents which make 
it difficult for others to make progress in developing new GMOs without infringing on 
the rights of existing patents. This creates barriers to the development of potential 
competitors to existing supplies of GMOs and reduces market competition. 
Some LDCs believe that such a situation is likely to be unfair to them since they are 
likely to be restricted in their future options of developing GMOs by the existence of 
patented GMOs, many of which are based on the modification of genetic material 
originally obtained from them e.g. soya beans (Xue et al., 2004). A further bone of 
contention is that in many cases, no compensation is paid to our LDC for use of the 
original genetic material used the presence of which was essential for the creation of 
the GMO. The issue of whether compensation should be paid for the use of such 
material is, however, complex from an economic point of view. From a global 
development and economic welfare point of view it can be argued that payment for 
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the use of extant genetic material of this type is only justified in special circumstances 
(Tisdell, forthcoming a). The matter is complicated for example, by the fact that some 
LDC make extensive use of genetic material derived from other LDCs (for instance, 
tomatoes and potatoes) and they also use genetic material that has come from 
countries that are now higher income countries, for example some types of maize 
from the United States. 
Lack of co-evolution 
GMOs are usually developed in experimental conditions divorced from local 
conditions. Whereas most other methods of genetic change involve slow and gradual 
changes in genetic material, creation of GMOs can result in rapid and large shifts in 
the composition of genetic material. Therefore, the creation of GMOs is considered to 
be relatively hazardous. Change may not be gradualistic, scope for learning by trial-
and-error may be reduced and the potential for irreversible consequences are seen as 
heightening the risk of releasing GMOs. Hence, there are considerable concerns about 
biosafety risks associated with the introduction of GMOs. 
A further potential problem is the lack of social and ecological co-evolution which 
can arise when new GMOs are released. Some writers, such as Norgaard (1994) 
regard lack of co-evolution to be undesirable. In the past, the social practices of many 
local communities evolved in step with changes in their agricultural and other 
productive practices, thus balance and social harmony existed between local 
communities and changes in production methods. In modern times, however, this 
harmony is destroyed by rapid changes in production methods and in types of 
production (Tisdell, 2003b, Ch. 19). The result in increasing stress for individuals and 
social dislocation. The introduction of GMOs potentially adds to this lack of co-
evolution. Lack of co-evolution seems to be symptomatic of modern economic 
systems. 
Social changes and variations in productive forces are interdependent, as observed by 
Marx (1930). The social desirability of such changes is always difficult to evaluate. 
For example, are the social changes that occur desirable or undesirable? If they are 
undesirable, does the increase in the availability of economic commodities as a result 
of the introduction of new techniques, e.g. GMOs, more than compensate for the 
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undesirability of the social changes that are generated? Scientific answers to such 
questions based on positivism are not available but consideration of these questions 
should not be avoided even though they are beyond the scope of economics when it is 
defined narrowly. 
Social conflicts about the use of GMOs 
The use of GMOs frequently creates social conflict. For example, some social groups 
are fearful of their possible biological consequences, including their possible long-
term impacts or health. Some buyers of produce wish to avoid products, particularly 
food products, that contain GMOs. This can result in some GM products selling at a 
reduced price compared to similar non-GMO products. This contributes in part to the 
occurrence of conflicts between growers of non-GMO crops and those cultivating GM 
crops.  
Two problems can occur:  
(1) cross pollination may occur between some GM and non-CM crops and  
(2) if it is unclear to buyers what produce is based on GMOs and which is not, 
they may become suspicious of crops for which both GM and non-CM 
varieties exist and reduce their demand for these crops. 
There is a problem of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in this case 
(Akerlof, 1970; Varian, 2006, Ch. 37). In this case, sellers know the nature of the 
product but buyers are unable to determine this just from inspection of the product. 
Consequently, there is scope for fraud by sellers. In extreme cases, this leads to the 
collapse of the whole market and in many cases results in reduced demand for some 
types of the marketed product. For example, in the case being considered here, it 
could result in the demand for produce which is claimed to be GM-free declining. 
Certification schemes can, however, help to reduce the problem and laws may be 
strengthened to require accurate disclosure of the nature of the goods being traded, 
that is whether they are GM-free or not. 
In order to reduce the problem of possible cross pollination of GM crops and non-GM 
crops, they may be located in areas that are spatially well separated. For some crops 
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which depend on drifts of pollen in the wind for pollination, border hedges may be 
required to lower the likelihood of pollen-drift. 
Some of the types of social conflicts between persons who want to grow GM crops 
and those who are opposed to this can be modelled by using game theory (Tisdell, 
forthcoming b). This will, however, not be discussed here. 
Legal liability for the use of GMOs is an issue. For example, to what extent should 
developers of GMOs be liable for any environmental damages caused by their use? To 
what extent should farmers who use GMOs be responsible for any environmental 
damages caused by their use?  
The socially appropriate extent of legal liability is difficult to determine. Strict 
liability for damages caused by a GMO will reduce economic incentives to develop 
and use them. The consequence could be loss of substantial economic benefits. 
Questions such as how wide ranging should legal liability for damages be, should it be 
capped, should a developer be absolved from legal liability if the government 
approves a GMO for use and to what extent should liability be reduced by the fact that 
its developer acts with care, all need to be considered (see Tisdell, 1993, Ch.5). It 
seems that as the level of income in countries rises that their preferences tend to shift 
from limited legal liability for possible damages caused by new products towards 
strict liability. 
The conferral of legal rights is one thing and enforcing them is another. Similarly, this 
is so for legal liability. Costs and other difficulties are involved in enforcing laws or 
taking advantage of the law. The costs sometimes exceed the expected benefits of 
legal action and actions are frequently uncertain. 
The question of the adequacy of proof and the burden of proof on parties affects the 
economics of pursuing legal action. If for example, a non-GMO crop is 
“contaminated” by a GM crop, it may be difficult to prove which farm(s) using GMs 
is (are) responsible. In Germany, this has resulted in laws being passed which make 
all growers of related GM crops in the locality legally responsible to contribute 
collectively to compensation. This means that the plaintiff does not have to identify 
the particular farm(s) that was (were) the sources of the “contamination”.  
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The stage at which it is socially optimal to release a GMO after the development and 
testing of it is difficult to determine. This is because even after considerable testing, 
some environmental impacts may be uncertain. Further delay may reduce those 
uncertainties but if the economic benefits from using the GMO seem to be substantial, 
delay involves considerable opportunity costs. It is usually too costly to wait for the 
release of a new economically promising GMO until virtually no doubts remain about 
its environmental impacts. Community standards and expectations have to be taken 
into account in deciding on the appropriate time at which to release a new GMO. 
5. Concluding Comments 
The ecology and economics of the development and use of GMOs is complex, 
particularly compared, for example to that for non-reproducing hybrids. The latter do 
not pose direct genetic risks and it is easier for developers of hybrids (which do not 
self-reproduce) than developers of GMOs to enforce their property rights. 
Consequently, in the case of hybrids, biosafety problems are of lower importance and 
economic problems of maintaining property rights are less acute. 
On the basis of the evidence presented, one would expect GMOs to be developed and 
marketed by larger enterprises rather than smaller ones. Furthermore, there is an 
economic incentive to develop GMOs that are likely to be used by large commercial 
farms rather than small or medium-sized farms. Market conditions are also liable to 
bias the development of GMOs in favour of large agricultural industries in higher 
income countries or plantation agriculture in developing countries, particularly those 
industries where large-sized commercial agricultural units predominate. 
It was also pointed out that the development and use of GMOs involves several other 
socioeconomic issues. For example, concerns have been raised about the possibility 
that patent walls might be used to block out potential new developers of GMOs 
including developers in less developed countries. Attention was also brought to the 
nature of conflicts between users and non-users of GMOs and matters involving the 
protection of buyers of products that may or may not be GM-free. Considerable 
attention was given to questions involving legal liability of the developers and users 
of GMO for any damages which they might cause. Many questions remain about the 
nature and type of legal liability that should be placed on developers and users of 
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GMOs taking into account such matters as the biosafety risks involved, for example, 
should liability be limited and if so, in what way? Who should take action if damages 
occur, for example, should it be the injured party, the state or both? What is to be the 
standard of proof and on whom should the onus of proof fall? Who will pay the costs 
of legal action? Decisions about such matters affect economic incentives to develop 
and use GMOs and the biosafety risks to which societies are exposed. 
It is evident that institutional arrangements for the development, introduction and use 
of GMOs are extremely important. The affect biosafety outcomes, incentives for the 
development of GMOs, the level of economic benefits obtained from their use and the 
distribution of these benefits. In this regard, the nature of patent systems and legal 
procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in GMOs are 
particularly important (Then, 2008). 
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